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A fundamental discussion in lower-level undergraduate neuroscience and psychology
courses is Descartes’s “radical” or “mind-body” dualism. According to Descartes, our
thinking mind, the res cogitans, is separate from the body as physical matter or
substance, the res extensa. Since the transmission of sensory stimuli from the body to the
mind is a physical capacity shared with animals, it can be confused, misled, or uncertain
(e.g., bodily senses imply that ice and water are different substances). True certainty thus
arises from within the mind and its capacity to doubt physical stimuli. Since this doubting
mind is a thinking thing that is distinct from bodily stimuli, truth and certainty are reached
through the doubting mind as cogito ergo sum, or the certainty of itself as it thinks: hence
Descartes’s famous maxim, I think, therefore I am. However, in the last century of Western
philosophy, with nervous system investigation, and with recent advances in neuroscience,
the potential avenues to explore student’s understanding of the epistemology and
effects of Cartesian mind-body dualism has expanded. This article further explores this
expansion, highlighting pedagogical practices and tools instructors can use to enhance
a psychology student’s understanding of Cartesian dualistic epistemology, in order to
think more critically about its implicit assumptions and effects on learning. It does so in
two ways: first, by offering instructors an alternative philosophical perspective to dualistic
thinking: a mind-body holism that is antithetical to the assumed binaries of dualistic
epistemology. Second, it supplements this philosophical argument with a practical
component: simple mind-body illusions that instructors may use to demonstrate contrary
epistemologies to students. Combining these short philosophical and neuroscience
arguments thereby acts as a pedagogical tool to open new conceptual spaces within
which learning may occur.
Keywords: Descartes, Cartesian dualism, Heidegger, rubber hand illusion, Pinocchio Illusion
Introduction
Undergraduate students typically pursue a university education with the aim of acquiring new
knowledge, certainty, or truth, about the world. Recent studies have demonstrated that as students
attempt to acquire knowledge about the mind and its connection to the world, they are quickly
confronted with what is known as the philosophical mind-body problem, or what is commonly
referred to as “substance dualism” or “Cartesian dualism” (Fahrenberg and Cheetham, 2000).
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Asserting a rigid ontological and epistemological difference
between the immaterial mind and the material body, psychology
students that fail to critically examine this Cartesian substance
dualism in greater detail place a greater emphasis upon the rote
memorization or surface-learning of knowledge and facts, which
Ryan (1984) has demonstrated to be less effective than processes of
interpretation and comprehension associated with understanding
and deep-learning. Dualist epistemology, in other words, leads
to weaker applications of knowledge, and to poorer grades, in
psychology classrooms (Ryan, 1984; Lonka andLindblom-Ylanne,
1996). This also runs the risk of tacitly transferring uncritical
scientific dualistic beliefs into future scientific, paramedical,
and medical professions (Demertzi et al., 2009). In order to
explore this tacit dualism in the classroom, therefore, this article
provides pedagogical tools that may be embraced by instructors
and students alike: first, by offering an alternative philosophical
grounding or epistemology for their learning and teaching,
based not in the dualistic philosophy of René Descartes, but
in the holistic philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Second, by
illustrating this alternative epistemological perspective in practice,
through simple neuroscience illusions such as the “Pinocchio”
and “Rubber Hand” illusions that manipulate the mind’s body
representation. In doing so, an instructor can make tacit dualistic
assumptions held by students prior to these arguments and
exercises, more explicit, so students may examine and think
more critically about them. With these differing epistemologies
and hands-on demonstrations, therefore, instructors expose or
challenge dualistic beliefs in their classroom, and facilitate deeper
learning or understanding within their students by illustrating
alternative ways of conceiving how their mind and body relates
to the world.
Although it is impossible to falsify a metaphysical problem
that has plagued Western philosophy since the Enlightenment
(and in other forms, since Plato), the purpose of this article is
not to attack Cartesian dualism itself, nor is it to examine every
single philosophical perspective that is contrary or alternative to
dualistic thinking. This is a complex and gargantuan philosophical
and scientific task that lies outside the scope of this short
article. Instead, it aims to provide students and instructors with
only one alternative to dualism in both thought (epistemology)
and action (classroom practice), in order to catalyze a different
way of thinking within the classroom: a more holistic way of
thinking andunderstanding how themind and body interconnect,
overlap, or exist, that differs from the surface-level epistemological
assumptions tacitly undergirding mind-body dualism. In doing
so, it aims not to counter or disprove metaphysical dualisms,
but to open new spaces for students to think critically about
their world, and other philosophies and practices that might also
disclose it in different ways more amenable to deep-learning
and understanding. Instructors will benefit their students by
promoting these critical faculties and perspectives through a
deeper engagement of both science and philosophy.
Cartesian Dualism
René Descartes (1596–1650), was a French mathematician,
philosopher, and scientist of the 17th century. The founder
of analytical geometry, he is now more commonly referred to
as the father of modern philosophy due to his revolutionary
reformulation of how truth, certainty, and the mind and body, are
understood ontologically and connected epistemologically. Prior
to Descartes, the composition of the mind was generally ascribed
to the way the “soul” arranged sensory stimuli to form thought, as
was proclaimed by Catholic orthodoxy. The mind and body were
fused within a person as one whole, and truths and certainties
steering the soul were determined a priori by God. The body
operated mechanistically, akin to animal-like automata; human
agency, mind, and thought, were derived from the workings of
the soul as prescribed by God and articulated through Church
doctrine.
Rather than simply attributing all of human thought and
being to God, Descartes’s rationalism posited a revolutionary
new foundation for truth and certainty: the subject’s rational and
thinking mind, or the “I” of subjectivity (Descartes, 1998). This
new rationality of self-certainty was grounded upon the capacity
for radical skepticism, or doubt. Under the spell of Cartesian
doubt, all empirical stimuli emanating from the material world
through bodily sight, taste, touch, etc., could always mislead the
mind, since, like in a dream, the mind cannot be certain these
physical sensations are real. “I will suppose,” wrote Descartes,
“not a supremely good God, the source of truth, but rather an
evil genius, supremely powerful and clever, who has directed his
entire effort at deceiving me.” (Descartes, 1998, p. 62) With no
way to be certain that “the air, the earth, colors, shapes, sounds,”
or any of the res extensa comprising our sensed body and the
substantive material world actually exists, Descartes claimed that
only one inexorable certainty and truth alone remained: “I see
very clearly that, in order to think, it is necessary to exist” (p.
18). To doubt, is still to think; and to think, is to exist or to
be. Hence, Descartes’s famous maxim that undergirds dualist
epistemology to this day: “I think, therefore I am” (cogito ergo
sum) (p. 18). Under this maxim, we can thus be certain of
our own thinking minds as existing separately from our sensed
substances and body, because the mind can perceive and reason
against what our body quickly misapprehends: “what I thought
I had seen with my eyes, I actually grasped solely through the
faculty of judgment, which is in my mind.” (p. 68). What my
body tells me are two different substances, water and ice, my
mind reasons are the same substance. Although later followers
of Cartesian rationalism and dualism abandoned Descartes’s
antiquated belief that the soul (mind) could meet and impact the
“vital spirits” of the mechanical workings of the body through the
brain’s pineal gland, the dualistic epistemology he posited between
thought/matter, subjectivity/objectivity, and mind/body, remains
tacitly entrenched in Western science, philosophy, and scientific
and cultural discourse, to this very day.
For instance, instructors may easily refer to recent Hollywood
films such as The Matrix (1999) or Inception (2010) as cultural
examples that illustrate (and risk entrenching) dualistic
epistemology: like Descartes’s “evil genius,” these films stress
that truths and certainties derived from sensed bodily stimuli
may indeed be dreamlike or misleading, but may be corrected
or overcome by a thinking self, and its rational mind. Here,
the mind is portrayed as being firmly distinct, separate, and in
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 11552
Hamilton and Hamilton Mind-body dualism and neuroscience
need of liberation from, the prison of the body whose stimuli
cannot be trusted. Indeed, recent studies have demonstrated that
dualistic beliefs are retained throughout a student’s education,
regardless of disciplinary background and training in otherwise
scientific, medical, and paramedical environments. Demertzi
et al. (2009) studied the presence of dualistic beliefs in a sample
of students from the University of Edinburgh in Scotland and
health-care workers and the general public at the University
of Lèige in Belgium. The majority of undergraduate students
surveyed agreed that “the mind and brain are two separate
things” and slightly less than half of the participants in the
Liege survey agreed to this statement (Demertzi et al., 2009).
Interestingly, almost half of health care professionals surveyed
also agreed with this dualistic statement. These findings highlight
the continued presence of dualistic beliefs throughout society
despite neuroscience studies, particularly those using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), that continue to suggest
that neural activity is responsible for psychological phenomenon
(Greene et al., 2001; Farrer and Frith, 2002), and therefore
that the brain is the origin of the mind. However, belief in
dualism is also dependent on perceived strength of the evidence
provided by scientific studies. When subjects are exposed to weak
neuroscientific evidence describing psychological phenomenon,
they have an increased tendency to believe in the presence of a
soul. Conversely, when the neuroscientific evidence is strong,
subjects are more likely to decrease their belief in the soul
(Preston et al., 2013). Therefore, in a neuroscience or psychology
classroom it is important to provide an accurate description of
current research, so that the relationship between themind, brain,
and body, may be problematised and explored more critically by
students and instructors alike.
The resilience of dualistic beliefs is also indicated by studies
demonstrating that some medical patients with somatoform
disorders are reluctant to attribute ailments to psychological
symptoms rather than to physical symptoms (Stone, 2006 as
cited in Demertzi et al., 2009), and some prefer to try and
identify physical rather than psychological causes of medically
unexplained symptoms (Geist et al., 2008), reinforcing the
Cartesian binary division between mind and matter. Indeed,
beliefs that the “soul” survives bodily death and destruction
remains prevalent within the scientific community, and dualism
even affects psychology’s own “neuroscientific thinking” by
implying that the material brain generates, yet remains radically
separate from, the mind (Demertzi et al., 2009). But could
dualistic thought patterns actually be detrimental to everyday life?
Recently, researchers have used priming procedures to induce
either “dualist” or “physicalist” beliefs and found that in the dualist
condition subjects engaged in less healthy attitudes and behaviors
(Forstmann et al., 2012).
Using Basic Philosophical Arguments in
Psychology Classrooms: Descartes and
Heidegger
If training or education in a university setting still risks
the retention of dualism’s presuppositions, then how might
instructors encourage a more critical and meaningful analysis
of dualist epistemology amongst their students? Philosophy and
science can work in tandem here when it comes to examining
subtle presuppositions of the mind-body problem and dualistic
epistemology. To take only one example from the vast canvas
of Western philosophy, let us examine the basic work of
Martin Heidegger, which can act as an example of how an
instructor might provide their students with a different, yet
equally powerful, epistemological perspective and understanding
of the world. The aim here is not to supplant nor to disprove
the metaphysical presuppositions of dualism, but to indicate how
an instructor might approach it using different philosophical and
epistemological perspectives.
Philosophically, Cartesian dualism’s assertion of an ontological
separation between mind and matter was radically undermined
by the publication of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, and
its revolutionary concept of “being-in-the-world” (Heidegger,
[1927] 1962). Contrary to the binaries of dualistic epistemology,
Heidegger argued that our modern and naturalized concepts of
subjectivity, “I,” cogito, or mind, could never be separated or
detached from objects, matter, or the world, as dualism assumes.
For Descartes, when a subject sees, cognizes, and uses everyday
objects such as a hammer, a doorknob, a pencil, etc., their thinking
mind crosses an ontological gulf to the world of matter and the
body, accruing sensory stimuli and empirical properties of these
material substances so as to compute, reason, and then actuate,
their rational use in the mind (Heidegger, [1927] 1962, p. 128).
Heidegger’s fundamental insight, however, was that each of these
“objects” makes sense to a “subject” not through any mental
rationalization or detached thinking or combination of sensed
properties. Instead, things have meaning or are disclosed to us
as humans, only through pre-reflective, learned, and everyday
contextual practices or uses. In other words, in modern times,
an object as simple as a hammer is recognized as something
that can pound a nail into wood only after a person has already
been socialized into cultural, linguistic, and discursive practices
in a shared world, that teaches them that this “hammer-thing”
is used in this specific way. A stick of wood and blob of metal
is, thus, disclosed to us as a hammer only after our enmeshment
in a shared world discloses to us the social and cultural contexts
and circumstances that make it intelligible as something to use.
“Such an entity can “meet up with” Dasein [i.e., the “thinking”
person] only so far as it can, of its own accord, show itself within
a world” (Heidegger, [1927] 1962, p. 84). The point here is that an
instructor can use Heidegger’s philosophy as a tool, to show how a
student’s implicit “being in the world” includes and undergirds the
metaphysical presumptions of dualism they once took for granted
or assumed.
Upon deeper inspection, when a person is in the actual process
of hammering a nail, turning a doorknob so as to walk through
a doorway, using a pencil to write down psychology notes,
etc., the ontological separation sustaining Cartesian mind-body
dualism breaks down. Why? According to Heidegger, each of
these “objects” can be made intelligible and understood because
they are enmeshed within countless and enormously complex
and interdependent historical, social, and cultural networked
contexts, that combine to give an “object” its naturalizedmeaning,
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TABLE 1 | A classroom exercise to discuss and critique dualistic themes in the media.
Media Dualistic theme What might Heidegger say? What is the alternative philosophic/
epistemological perspective?
Example: The Matrix (1999) The mind is a separate entity from the body, and
can’t trust its senses; it can control them! The “self” is
ultimate, choosing its destiny and shaping its world.
The contextual “world” within the Matrix, within which Neo was raised, would
actually make the “real” world completely different and incommensurable to
him when he was eventually exposed to it. So, unlike the movie’s claims, the
Matrix and the “real world” would actually have to be very similar for the mind’s
ontological/epistemological perspectives of being to share and to make sense
of both worlds, simultaneously. It’s clear the separation between mind/body
or mind/world posited by the movie couldn’t be possible.
Ghost (1990)
Being John Malkovich (1999)
Other Movies:
significance, and use. Although we contextualize a hammer as
an object to pound nails, an ancient Greek, or an alien from
another planet, would lack the social, cultural, and psychological
contexts that makes this “thing” meaningful or intelligible to
us: boards, nails, saws, screws, structures, bookshelves, ladders,
paints, etc., combine to form an “equipmental totality” that is
historically and culturally unique to us, yet is acquired and made
implicit through our everyday socialized use (Heidegger, [1927]
1962). These are the countless and networked things we know
are related and associated with every thing that our world makes
intelligible: its background associations and contexts that make
it an intelligible thing, to use in a particular way. Understood
in this light, no amount of rational thinking can ever inform
us what something as simple as a hammer actually is in a
dualistic context. A student could never look at a hammer, for the
first time, and simply rationalize its use. Instead, “What makes
agency possible is not some underlying [material] substrate, not
some mental substance, but is rather the way our life stories
unfold against the backdrop of practices of a shared, meaningful
world.” (Guignon, 2006, p. 9) Hence, Heidegger’s famous dictum
“being-in-the-world” eliminates the supposed gulf or dualism
between subject and object, mind and body, etc (Heidegger,
[1927] 1962). As human beings, upon birth, we are “thrown” into
a particular world that imprints within us particular and pre-
reflective ways of understanding, communicating, and navigating,
practices and our own “being” in a world of intertwined contexts
and meanings. Again, the point here is that the mind and
body are not inherently different substances, until modern,
everyday, and tacit cultural practices, such as the Cartesian dualist
epistemologies examined above, reveals or discloses them to us
in our own particular historical contexts, as two separate entities.
In order to use this philosophy as a pedagogical tool in their
classroom, an educator in an introductory psychology class may
therefore lecture on the Heideggerian examples given above,
then use classroom discussion or a group activity to determine
whether students understand the concept and this contrary
epistemological perspective. For example, “Name an example of a
recent movie or television series that assumes Cartesian dualism,
and counter this with Heidegger’s [or, another philosopher of
the instructor’s choice] position.” See Table 1 for some simple
examples. As will be examined below, therefore, psychological
illusions that problematize commonsensical (mis)understandings
of our body’s existence in space will help to illustrate how our
body’s ongoing situatedness in a world is often forgotten or taken
for granted.
Body Representation and Body Schema
In order for any physical interactions between an individual and
the external world to occur, such as hammering a nail with a
hammer, using a pencil in a classroom, or avoiding a pylon
while walking down the street, the mind must have a concept
of the body’s position in space. The mind must be situated in-
a-world. Proprioceptors are receptors located in muscles and
joints that relay information about muscle stretch and joint angle
to the thalamus and eventually the somatosensory area of the
cerebral cortex. The mind’s schema of the body incorporates
proprioceptive cues with other senses, namely vision and feedback
from the motor system that allow humans (and likely most other
animals) to mentally model where the body is in its external
space. The body schema plays a role in the constant production of
awareness of body configuration by associating various perceptual
inputs, calculating and reconstructing any missing information,
and detecting and resolving conflicts (Graziano and Botvinick,
2002). In the classroom setting it can be a difficult task to clearly
demonstrate that the mind and the body may be one and the
same. However, there are some simple perceptual demonstrations
that can be used for this purpose that alter the mind’s body
schema. Thus, by altering input to the body’s sensory system
the mind can become confused and produce illusory conclusions
about what is happening to the body. If subjective experiences
are brought about by the mind, which exists differently than
our sensed substances and body, then would illusions caused by
an alteration of sensory perception have an effect on the mind?
According to interaction dualists, like Descartes, the mind and
body are causally linked and can communicate with one another
and this interaction between the soul and body occurs through the
pineal gland. However, if the mind is generated by the activity of
neuronal circuitry in the brain that is partially influenced by the
sensory systems of the body (whose connections are independent
of the pineal gland), then confusing input to the brain may result
in altered, illusory, perception of the mind. In fact, this notion is
how some scientists have developed techniques to treat “phantom
limb pain.” In this condition, amputees still feel pain in their limb
that has been removed. It is recommended that educators teach
this fascinating condition to students anddiscuss the “mirror-box”
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FIGURE 1 | The pinocchio illusion. (A) The participant extends their
dominant arm so that vibration may be applied to biceps tendon. It is
important to first place the vibration on the crux of the arm (arrow). (B) The
subject then bends their arm, closes their eyes, and places their index finger
on their nose. Usually after 1–2 min the subject will feel that their nose is
growing.
as treatment for this condition (McGeoch and Ramachandran,
2012; also see Youtube link1). Following is a description of two
simple, yet thought-provoking, illusions that can be performed
in a classroom. The use of these demonstrations can be a salient
mechanism to maintain the focus of the students and use a
differentmodality to discussmind-body duality. These perceptual
illusions described below can alter themind’s representation of the
body in space.
Pinocchio Illusion
In the 1940s classic Walt Disney movie, Pinocchio was a fictional
marionette character that was made of wood, and is best known
because his nose grew whenever he told a lie. By vibrating the
biceps brachii tendon, that sends proprioceptive input to the brain,
it is possible to evoke the feeling of the nose growing and thus has
been coined The Pinocchio Illusion (Lackner, 1988). This simple
illusion can be produced by having a subject close their eyes and
1http://www.ted.com/talks/vilayanur_ramachandran_on_your_mind?
language=en
A B
FIGURE 2 | The rubber hand illusion. (A) The participant extends their left
hand into the enclosure so they cannot see their hand. They stare at the
rubber hand, or glove (shown here), that is in an identical orientation to their
hand in the enclosure. The person administering the illusion uses both paint
brushes to touch the participant and the rubber hand in an identical manner.
The illusion usually takes 1–2 min to take effect. (B) In some participants who
are very susceptible to the illusion, another object may be placed where the
rubber hand was. In this example, the person administering the illusion would
“paint” the dinosaur and the hand in an identical manner. For some people the
dinosaur will feel like it is a part of the body.
touch their nose with a finger while the biceps tendon of that
arm is vibrated (see Figure 1). The phantom sensation that is
produced in some participants (Burrack and Brugger, 2005) is an
elongation of the nose. The vibration of the biceps tendon triggers
muscle spindes to send proprioceptive input to the brain that
signals the extension of the arm (an increase in elbow joint angle;
DiZio and Lackner, 2002). Because the brain is also getting tactile
input from both the nose and finger tip that they are touching,
the combination of these stimuli are combined in the brain to
conclude, incorrectly, that the nose is growing/moving away from
the face. Note that the dominant arm should be used along with a
vibration frequency of about 100Hz for an optimal effect (Burrack
and Brugger, 2005) and therefore, basic hand massagers may not
initiate the illusion.
Rubber Hand Illusion
Another illusion, which it is commonly called “the rubber hand
illusion” (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998), tricks the mind into feeling
that an external object (commonly a rubber hand) is part of the
body (see Figure 2, also see2). In this illusion the participant
directs their vision to a rubber hand on a table while their
corresponding left or right hand is placed out of view. The person
administering the illusion then uses a paintbrush to touch the
rubber hand in an identical fashion to the real hand. After a
few minutes of “painting” the fingers, knuckles, and hand most
participants will feel like the rubber hand is part of their own
body. This is due to the conflicting input from the external stimuli
received by the photoreceptors in the eyes and mechanoreceptors
and proprioceptors in the skin. This conflicting input travels from
the thalamus to the somatosensory cortex, then an association
area in the cortex where the brain makes the ultimate decision,
2https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TCQbygjG0RU
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which is incorrect, that the object located outside of the body,
must be part of the body. In this sense, the brain has altered
its mental image of the body schema to incorporate the rubber
hand. Researchers have demonstrated that this is an alteration of
the body’s perception of where the hand is located in space by
asking participants to complete a follow-up test. After the rubber
hand illusion was administered to the left hand, participants
were instructed to close their eyes and line up the right hand
(underneath the table) to where they believed their left hand was
located. They found that there was a significant shift in where
the participants thought their left hand was in the direction of
the illusory rubber hand, and the strength of this distortion was
correlated with the efficacy of the rubber hand illusion itself
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). Some studies report using a paint
brush and model of a human hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998),
however, a glove and tactile stimulation of the handwith fingertips
can also be used if a model of a rubber hand and paintbrushes are
not available.
Summary
This perspectives article has outlined how instructors can explore
the epistemological assumptions undergirding Cartesian dualism
on both philosophical and scientific grounds. The philosophy
of Heidegger highlights how our ongoing enmeshment and
involvement in a social and cultural world makes certain objects
intelligible, thinkable, and meaningful to us—such as the implicit
understanding required in using something as simple as a
hammer, which derives not from detached rationalizations of
bodily sensory data or stimuli, but from cultural practices making
its use intelligible and normal. The psychological Rubber Band
and Pinocchio Illusions reinforce the basic insight that the body
and mind are enmeshed in a shared world, by transgressing the
supposed dualisms of mind-body highlighted by Descartes, yet
with an understanding that the rational mind is not a superior
a priori modicum for understanding truth. Even philosophy,
metaphysics, and science, is undergirded by a shared sense of
world that cannot emanate from a rational mind in-itself. For
instance, by stimulating the body with touch or vibration, the
sensory input is incorporated into the brain’s mental schema
of where the body is in external space, and with the illusions
described here; and this is incorrectly interpreted by the mind as
an illusory conclusion (that the nose is growing, or the rubber
hand is part of one’s body). The mind’s rational assumptions
about its body, self, and world, are problematised. In so doing,
these simple illusions can be presented alone or together with
differing philosophical perspectives as pedagogical tools to
educate students by promoting increased and critical thinking
about dualistic presuppositions.
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